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SYMPOSIUM

FEDERAL PRIVILEGES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
INTRODUCTION
DavidP. Leonard*
Thirty years after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1 privileges remain uncodified. Though the rules as
promulgated by the Supreme Court contained nine separate
privileges, 2 the issue of privileges became contentious when
Congress took up the proposed rules,3 and threatened to sink the
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
2. FED. R. EvID. art. V (Proposed Draft 1972). The proposed rules would
have created a privilege covering reports and returns required by law
(Proposed Rule 502), an attorney-client confidential communications privilege
(Proposed Rule 503), a psychotherapist-patient confidential communications
privilege (Proposed Rule 504), a privilege for one spouse to prevent the other
spouse from testifying against him or her in a criminal proceeding (Proposed
Rule 505), a privilege for confidential communications between clergy and a
person consulting the member of the clergy (Proposed Rule 506), a privilege
protecting the secrecy of political votes (Proposed Rule 507), a trade secrets
privilege (Proposed Rule 508), a state secrets and official information privilege
(Proposed Rule 509), and a privilege protecting the identity of informers
(Proposed Rule 510). Id. Each proposed privilege also had specified
exceptions, and other rules dealt with issues of waiver (Proposed Rule 511),
privileged matter disclosed under compulsion or without the opportunity to
claim the privilege (Proposed Rule 512), and comment upon or inference from
a claim of privilege (Proposed Rule 513). Id.
3. The story of how and why Congress rejected the Supreme Court's draft
on privileges has been told many times. Kenneth Broun, a contributor to this
Symposium, has written:
The presence of those rules became a rallying point for general
opposition to the entire proposal and a symbol for all that was
perceived to be wrong with the rules as a whole. Not only was the
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entire enterprise of codifying federal evidence law.4 To break the
impasse, Congress rejected the specific privileges originally
proposed and substituted a single general rule. Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in
5
law.
State
with
accordance
The effect of Rule 501 is to leave the creation, refinement, and
evolution of federal privileges to the common law process. There are
advantages to this approach.
For one thing, the legislative

substance of the proposed privilege rules vigorously attacked by
scholars, practitioners, judges and members of Congress, the idea that
the federal law of privilege should be codified was rejected by many.
Many academics and practicing lawyers preferred an uncodified
federal law of privilege, and, in particular, one that relied upon state
privilege law. There was especially widespread criticism of a federal
law of privilege insofar as it would govern diversity cases.
Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance-Testimonial
Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 769, 769
(2002); see also 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EvIDENCE § 5241, at 652 (1980)
("[T]he controversy over issues of privilege was to be a major factor in the
decision of Congress to intervene for the first time in the rulemaking
process."); Timothy P. Glynn, FederalizingPrivilege, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 59,
87-90 (1992) (citing many reasons for Congress's rejection, most importantly
concern that privilege rules are substantive in nature and thus that Congress did
not have the power under the Erie doctrine or the Rules Enabling Act to enact

them).
4. "The testimonial privilege rules in the Proposed Rules of Evidence
submitted to Congress by the United States Supreme Court in 1972 almost
doomed the total project." Broun, supra note 3, at 769.
5. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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recognition of privileges has too often had more to do with the
relative degrees of influence particular professions have in the
legislatures than with the substantive values and goals supporting
privileges. 6 Given that fact, it is not surprising that lawyers enjoy a
very broad privilege, while physicians (at least those not rendering
mental health care services) have very limited privileges. 7 In
addition, leaving the recognition and shaping of privileges to the
common law process allows privileges to evolve over time, a process
6. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5422, at 673-76 (1980).
The authors state:
In a society with egalitarian pretensions, the creation and
justification of a privilege to refuse to respond to a judicial inquiry is
essentially a political question; i.e., it is an allocation of power as
between the various components of the society. At one level it
involves the power of the judge against the power of the witness, and
this allocation can have ramifications in terms of the power
relationships of the litigants who depend upon the court for the
enforcement of their rights.
Given the political nature of privileges, it is not surprising that in
most states the allocation of these exemptions tends to follow the
distribution of political power in contemporary society. Powerful
institutions-such as the church, government, and corporations-and
professions that primarily serve a monied clientele (and are therefore
thought prestigious)-doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists-are given
privileges to preserve their secrets and those of their clients. But
professions and institutions that serve analogous functions for working
class people are denied such protection; compare, for example, the
treatment of communications to tax lawyers with those to storefront
tax preparers. Even the privileges nominally available to persons of
modest means tend to be of less significance because of the existence
of extra-judicial powers of compulsion or the way in which the
privilege is administered in the courts. As a cynic once remarked, "the
poor man's only privilege is perjury."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. The version of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted to
Congress did not contain a general physician-patient privilege. Federal courts
today generally do not recognize the privilege. EDWARD J. IMW[NKELRIED,
1 THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE; EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES

§ 6.2.6, at 491-92 (2002); see also 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 341 (2002) (stating
that some jurisdictions do not recognize any general physician-patient
privilege); Brett T. DeLange, Recent Development, Waiving the PhysicianPatient Privilege in Involuntary Commitment Proceedings in Washington-In
re R., 97 Wn. 2d 182, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), 59 WASH. L. REV. 103, 105 (1983)
(stating that Washington state courts "have tended to construe the statutory
privilege narrowly, holding it to be in derogation of the common law").
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that does not occur as easily when rules are legislated.
On the other hand, to the extent uniformity, certainty and
predictability are important in effectuating the goals of privilege
law, 8 leaving the development of privilege law to the courts has its
disadvantages. Two hundred years of common law development
have given us divergent rules of privilege, making it particularly
difficult for a litigant or potential litigant to predict which, if any,
conversations, actions, or information will be within the scope of a
privilege. In addition, as Wright and Graham have pointed out, there
is reason to suspect the objectivity of courts in fashioning privileges
because "every expansion of privilege is of necessity a diminution in
the power of the judiciary." 9 Because of this inherent tension, the
judiciary can be expected to resist any effort to expand the number of
privileges or the scope of existing privileges, even when social
values might support such moves.
To assume, however, that Congress can do a better job of setting
forth the limits of privilege might be unjustified as well. If judges
are subject to the biases inherent in their position, Congress is often
captive to interest groups that do not necessarily reflect the broader
interests of society at large. Thus, even as a general question, the
wisdom of codification is unclear. But should Congress conclude
that the time has come to add specific rules of privilege to the
Federal Rules of Evidence,' 0 it still must resolve many issues. One
key issue has to do with the nature of the Federal Rules as a whole.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are not an exhaustive catalog of
specific provisions." In fact, few of the rules categorically admit or
8. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("[I]f
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all.").
9. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 3, § 5422, at 669. The authors see
this lack of judicial objectivity as at least one argument for legislative control
over the creation of privileges. Id.

10. Federal law requires that any rules of privilege be enacted by Congress.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1994 & Supp. 2004) ("Any... rule creating, abolishing,
or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress.").
11. See Eileen A. Scallen & Andrew E. Taslitz, Reading the FederalRules
of Evidence Realistically: A Response to Professor Imwinkelried, 75 OR. L.

Winter 2004]

INTRODUCTION

519

12
exclude evidence; most are written to give the trial court flexibility.

Trial judges are explicitly instructed to apply the rules in a manner
that achieves "fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."' 13 Thus, judicial development and
of evidence law is a built-in feature of the Federal
refinement
14
Rules.
REv. 429, 439-40 (1996). "The Evidence Advisory Committee... adopt[ed]
a code, not a creed or catalogue, 'draw[ing] a series of rules in general terms
covering the larger divisions and subdivisions of the subject without
attempting to frame rules of thumb for specific situations and to make the trial
judge's rulings reviewable for abuse of discretion."' Id. (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted).
12. See generally David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence
Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937 (1990) (concluding evidence law does not accord
trial courts the freedom generally associated with true discretion); Thomas M.
Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the FederalRules of Evidence, 74 IOWA
L. REv. 413 (1989) (arguing the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
intended to allow trial courts to fairly apportion the benefit of close rulings
between parties).
13. FED. R. EvID. 102.
14. Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 329, 395-96 (1995) ("Congress's main purpose in passing the Federal
Rules of Evidence was to adopt the views of the Supreme Court and the
Advisory Committee; the Rules should be interpreted accordingly. But the
Advisory Committee intended to create a system of guided discretion for trial
judges, limited appellate review, and room for case-by-case growth of the law
of evidence." (footnotes omitted)); see also Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal
Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 909, 921 (1992) ("Implicit in
every undefined [Rules'] term.., is the hope that the courts will finish the
job of rulemaking."); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the
Interpretationof the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1310
(1992) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence were consciously drawn with a
recognition that the federal trial judiciary possess substantial inherent
discretion in interpreting, expanding upon, and applying the Rules.").
Reviewing the debates that preceded the drafting of the Federal Rules, one
author has stated that what emerged is a middle ground between a catalog and
a single, simple rule of discretion:
Writing in 1930, Professor McCormick noted that "the present system
in vogue in the United States" was typified by "sharply defined rules
prohibiting the admission of many rigidly classified types of
evidence," and he hypothesized that one orientation for reform "might
lean toward vesting a large discretion in the trial judge to admit or
exclude, guided only by certain general canons and standards." A
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The need for judicial development of evidence law becomes
even more evident when one considers that the rules are not even
comprehensive in subject-matter coverage. Some areas of the law,
including presumptions 15 and witness impeachment,' 6 are left only
partially codified. Some important matters of evidentiary practice
and policy are left out of the Federal Rules entirely.' 7 John Henry
Wigrnore, no friend of codification but one who believed that any8
codification undertaken should be specific and comprehensive,'
decade later, the American Law Institute debated the form for the

Model Code of Evidence it was preparing. Wigmore, the giant of

American evidence law, urged a detailed catalog, while Judge Charles
Clark-who drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an
academic before appointment to the bench-urged adoption of "one
broad rule of admissibility of relevant evidence," with a few
subordinate clarifying rules. Ultimately, the federal evidence rules
went beyond Clark's minimalist approach, but left broad areas subject
mainly to the control of the trial judge in light of the circumstances of
the case.
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1579 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Another article refers to the list of
privileges contained in the Advisory Committee's draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a "catalog."
The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Rule 501Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 110 HARV. L. REV. 287, 287 (1996).
15. See FED. R. EvIm. 301 (setting forth a general rule for application of
presumptions in civil cases, but containing no provision for criminal trials).
16. See FED. R. EVID. art. VI (governing certain witness impeachment
issues and methods, but leaving out others).
17. One example is the court's right to sum up or comment upon the
evidence. The draft that was submitted to Congress contained a provision
regulating this (Proposed Rule 105), but Congress rejected it, leaving the
Federal Rules silent on the subject.
18. Wignore opposed earlier codification efforts such as the Model Code
of Evidence partly on the ground that they were incomplete statements of the
law. The Introduction to the Model Code of Evidence, to which Wigmore
served as Chief Consultant, specifically notes Wigmore's "emphatic"
disagreement with the form and substance of the draft ultimately approved:
"From the inception of the task,... Mr. Wignore, emphatically disagreed with
the way in which the problems of drafting should be approached and
formulated.... [T]here is a fundamental difference of approach and method
between the Reporter and his Advisers on the one hand and Mr. Wigmore's on
the other." William Draper Lewis, Introduction to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
xiii (1942). Wignore was wary of any effort to codify evidence law, but
believed if codification were to occur, it should be comprehensive. He
proposed a code that would have contained several hundred rules and ran well
over 500 pages. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE'S CODE OF THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1942).
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surely must be spinning in his grave, 19 for the Federal Rules are
neither.
What, then, to make of the federal law of privileges? At present,
federal privilege law is highly uncertain. Except where the Supreme
Court has interceded, 20 it is not yet clear which privileges are

recognized under federal law, and even where there is consensus on
the existence of a privilege, its precise form varies from court to
court. To a great degree, this is a necessary consequence of the
nature of judicial process as compared with legislation. Because
courts resolve only the issues before them, the development of

detailed rules and standards requires numerous cases and often a
lengthy period of time. By contrast, a legislature may create a
detailed set of rules covering a particular privilege as well as its

exceptions. This does not mean legislatures more often get it right;
19. After writing these words, I discovered that I am not the first one to
express in print the possibility that Wigmore is not resting comfortably in his
grave. Tennessee maintains an unusual version of the spousal communications
privilege which actually appears to require the trial judge to assess whether
Wigmore's four criteria for recognition of a privilege would be met in the
particularcase before the court. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(c) (2004).
Thus, in State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), the
appellate court assessed the state of the marriage at the time of trial, and
decided that because the marriage was on the rocks at that point, the privilege
did not apply to the murder defendant's statement to his wife that he had killed
the victim for touching her inappropriately. Calling the statute "crazy," one
commentator wrote that Wigmore "is turning in his grave." Donald F. Paine,
Autopsy on Spousal Privilege,40 TENN. B.J. 32, 32 (2004).
Another commentator expressed similar frustration with a call to
interpret the Maine Constitution's self-incrimination privilege, ME. CONST. art.
1, § 6, to forbid involuntary blood-alcohol testing. See Donald W. Macomber,
The Maine Constitution's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Revisited-A
Response to Mr. Waxman, 11 ME. B.J. 380, 380 (1996) (responding to a
suggestion made by Michael J. Waxman, Fifth Amendment, Shmifth
Amendment: For Real Protection Against Compelled Self-Incrimination in
OUI Prosecutions,Look to the Maine Constitution, 11 ME. B.J. 148 (1996)).
The author quotes Greenleaf's statement that the privilege only applies to oral
or written statements, and not to physical evidence, Macomber, supra (citing 1
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 469(e) (14th ed. 1899)), and states, "Professor
Greenleaf, I fear, is rolling over in his grave!" Id. Wigmore, it should be
noted, was the reviser of the volume of Greenleaf's Fourteenth Edition that
contains this material. In a sense, then, Wigmore is rolling over right
alongside Greenleaf.
20. One notable example is the Court's recognition of a broad therapistpatient privilege. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (resolving a split
among Courts of Appeals and recognizing the privilege).
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experience shows that this is often not true. 2 1 But at least legislative
process is more suited to the creation of comprehensive rules.
Then there is the question of what qualifies as a privilege.22 All
would agree that the rules governing evidentiary use of confidential
attorney-client, clergy-penitent, spousal, or psychotherapist-patient
communications create and define the scope of privileges, but not all
rules of evidentiary secrecy fit this same two-way relational pattern.
Some rules we consider to be privileges do not involve confidential
communications between two parties.
The privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is an obvious example,2 3 but there are
others. 24 In addition, in early editions of his treatise, McCormick
categorized the rules governing evidence of compromise and
subsequent remedial measures as privileges. 25 Though the authors of
21. California's history with respect to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
is a good example. Until 1970, the definition of "psychotherapist" included
only medical doctors who devote a substantial portion of their time to the
practice of psychiatry (or who are reasonably believed by the patient to be
psychiatrists) and licensed psychologists. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1010 note
(1995 & Supp. 2004) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In 1970, an amendment
added licensed clinical social workers and credentialed school psychologists.
Id. § 1010(c) and (d). An amendment in 1972 added licensed marriage, family,
and child counselors. Id. § 1010(e). In 1987, the statute was amended to
include supervised registered psychological assistants, child counselor interns,
and associate clinical social workers. Id. § 1010(f). 1988 saw the addition of
certain other persons under the supervision of licensed psychologists or board
certified psychiatrists, supervised psychological interns, other supervised
trainees, registered nurses with master's degrees in psychiatric mental health
counseling, and other persons rendering mental health treatment under
specified provisions of the Family Code. Id. § 1010(h)-(k). Though some of
the gradual broadening of the definition of psychotherapist can be attributed to
the growth of new classes of therapists, the earlier narrow definition almost
certainly reflected class bias. Only those with fairly substantial means (or very
good medical insurance plans) are able to consult psychiatrists or licensed
psychologists; other professionals, such as clinical social workers and school
psychologists, are available to a broader class of people.
22. It has been noted that "[t]here does not seem to be any attempt to define
the term in the literature or in any of the codes." 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 5422, at 667.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ").
24. For example, the authors of the current edition of McCormick's treatise
refer to the constitutional doctrines protecting against the use of confessions
and unlawfully obtained evidence as privileges. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 72, at 299 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
25. About the subsequent remedial measures rule, McCormick wrote:
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the current edition of McCormick's treatise consider the treatment of
' 2 6 they retain
these rules as privileges to be "analytically imprecise,
the notion that these rules are similar to privileges in that they are
based primarily on a desire to encourage or discourage particular outof-court conduct 27 rather than to preserve the "integrity of the
adjudication process." 28 Still, McCormick had a point. When
thinking about privileges, perhaps it is better to think about the
nature and purpose of the rule than about what we normally call it.
In addition, advocates of codification should remember that
29
some privileges are constitutionally based. Among them are some
of the privileges we hold most dear, including the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination 30 and the exclusion at trial of illegally
seized evidence. 3 1 Codification of these privileges in evidence rules
would not be wise. The same might not be true, however, with
respect to other privileges that have some basis in the Constitution
but have been fleshed out primarily through the common law
process. I refer here to the broad government privileges, including
presidential ("executive") privilege, protection of state secrets and
official information, and protection of the identity of an informer,
The dominant motive for exclusion [of subsequent remedial measures
evidence], it seems clear, is the reason often relied on in the opinions;
namely, the policy of discouraging the taking of steps to remove a
danger. Manifestly, this is an external policy, not looking to the trial
and truth-finding, but to the interest of public safety. If so, then
according to the analysis suggested herein, the rule is one of privilege.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77, at 159
(1954); see also id. § 76, at 157-58 (reaching the same conclusion with respect
to evidence of compromise or compromise offers).
26. 1 MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE, supranote 24, § 72.1, at 301.
27. 1 Id.
28. 1 Id. § 72, at 301.
29. One author reminds us that there are, in fact, at least four sources of
current federal privilege law: "(1) privileges created by federal statute; (2)
constitutional privileges; (3) privileges from 'common law principles'; and (4)
state privilege law in diversity cases." Michael F. Kelleher, Comment, The
Confidentiality of Criminal Conversationson TDD Relay Systems, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 1349, 1359 (1991). The author characterizes the state of standardization

of federal privilege law as "schizophrenic." Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated....").
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among others. 32 Codifiers should consider whether it is wise to try to
capture the essential elements of these privileges as they go about
codifying the more familiar privileges.
Finally, any effort to codify federal privileges should recognize
the constitutional constraints on application of federal law in
diversity cases. In such cases, the Erie doctrine 33 requires federal
courts to apply state substantive law to matters not governed by
federal law. 34 Though most evidence rules are not substantive in
nature, some are, 35 and federal courts must be mindful of that fact in
situations where state and federal law conflict. The privilege rule
Congress adopted took account of the Erie doctrine by deferring to
state privilege law on issues governed by state substantive law, a
result consistent with the pre-Rules practice in most federal courts
that had considered the issue. 37 Whether the Constitution requires
that result is something codifiers might want to revisit.38
I. THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
Is it time to reassess the decision not to codify privilege rules in
the Federal Rules of Evidence? Is uniformity less important in this
area than in, say, the hearsay or character evidence rules? Where has
the light of "reason and experience" taken the federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, in the area of privileges? The Loyola
32. See 2

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL

EVIDENCE § 220, at 504 (2d ed. 1994) (listing various government privileges).
33. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
.34. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Id. at 78.
35. See David Wadsworth, Forma Scientific v. Biosera and the
Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Products
Liability Actions, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 757, 780-87 (2000) (discussing the
effect of the Erie doctrine on application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in
diversity cases).
36. See FED. R. EviD. 501 (providing that "in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State
law").
37. See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 32, § 175, at 256
(asserting that later pre-Rules authority supported application of state privilege
law in diversity cases).
38. For a thoughtful exploration of Erie's application to privilege rules, see

2 id. §§ 172-177.
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of Los Angeles Law Review has assembled a diverse group of
prominent scholars to assess these and other questions related to
federal privilege law. The authors were given free rein, and each
chose to address a different aspect of privileges. Though some of
our scholars discuss the codification question more directly than
others, all address issues that must be considered by those who
would attempt codification. I will not attempt to summarize each
contribution in detail. Instead, I will simply touch on the major
themes addressed in each.
For her contribution to this Symposium,3 9 Professor Eileen
Scallen takes on one of the most fundamental problems faced by
privilege codifiers: identifying exactly what constitutes a "privilege."
Among the subjects Professor Scallen has examined in previous
work are the use of "practical reasoning" in the interpretation of
rules 40 and the politics of evidence rulemaking. 41 Here, Professor
Scallen argues that evidence codifiers should recognize that there are
two types of privilege: "informational privilege" (which protects
specific information) and "relational privilege" (which promotes and
Professor Scallen analyzes a
protects certain relationships).42
number of areas of judicial confusion about privileges, and also
reminds us that some doctrines, such as work-product protection, are
actually "quasi-privileges" because they arise from the nature of the
adversary system rather than the promotion of confidentiality in
certain relationships. 43 This, as well, should affect the shape and
Scallen then offers a means of
scope of any codification.
"rethinking" privileges by observing the distinction between
By doing so, she argues,
relational and informational privileges.
we can see the different rationales that support the two types of
privileges. This realization, in turn, should affect such fundamental
questions as whether a particular privilege should provide absolute or
qualified protection. Finally, Scallen turns her attention to the
39. Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the
Case of the Mysterious Mediation Privilege, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 537 (2004).
40. Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the

Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717 (1995).
41. Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,"
53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002).

42. Scallen, supra note 39, at 539.
43. Id. at 549.
44. Id. at 568-76.
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"mysterious" mediation privilege created under California law.45
She concludes that it has features of both informational and relational
privileges, a fact that lends a degree of uncertainty about its proper
scope, the resolution of which has not yet been achieved.
In a previous article,46 Professor Timothy Glynn surveyed the
state of the attorney-client privilege, and found enormous variation
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as well as among the federal courts.
Concerned about the lack of certainty in the scope of the privilege,
and asserting the importance of certainty in privileges, Professor
Glynn concluded that Congress should adopt preemptive legislation
providing for uniform rules of attorney-client privilege in both state
and federal courts. 47 In his contribution to this Symposium, 48
Professor Glynn continues to assess the state of the attorney-client
privilege. This examination is particularly important in the wake of
several major corporate accounting scandals and the resulting
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposes on corporate
attorneys the obligation to report violations of securities law or other
wrongdoing within the company. 49 He concludes that the need for
clarification of the attorney-client privilege is greater than ever as a
result of "intrajurisdictional confusion, interjurisdictional conflict,
and extrajudicial decisions," 50 but that it is unlikely Congress will
adopt preemptive legislation. As a second-best alternative, Professor
Glynn proposes codification of the attorney-client privilege for
federal courts. Doing so, he argues, will better serve the instrumental
purpose of the privilege: to encourage candor between attorneys and
clients.
45. Id. at 578-94.
46. Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59
(2002).
47. Id. at 63-64, 133-41.
48. Timothy P. Glynn, One Privilege to Rule Them All? Some PostSarbanes-Oxleyand Other Reflections on a Federally-CodifiedAttorney-Client
Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 597 (2004).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp II 2002). Section 307 of the Act requires
the Securities and Exchange Commission to issue rules "setting forth minimum
standards of profession conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before
the commission in any way in the representation of issuers." Id. The
Commission is instructed to issue a rule requiring attorneys to "report evidence
of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company .... " Id.
50. Glynn, supra note 48, at 634.
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Professor Kenneth Broun is a former member of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Currently, he serves
as a consultant to the Advisory Committee, for which he is
conducting a survey of federal privilege law. For his contribution to
this Symposium, Professor Broun has chosen to examine some
important aspects of the medical privilege as it has evolved in the
federal courts. 51 Professor Broun notes that the Supreme Court's
recognition of a broad federal psychotherapist-patient privilege5 2 did
nothing to change the federal courts' refusal to recognize a general
physician-patient privilege. Indeed, all federal courts that have
considered such a privilege have rejected it. 53 This contrasts sharply
with the practice in the states, more than forty of which do recognize
a general physician-patient privilege. 54 Professor Broun surveys the
emerging parameters of the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege,
and reviews the arguments in favor of and against the creation of a
general physician-patient privilege. Ultimately, he concludes that
although there are good arguments on both sides, on balance the
rationales supporting the psychotherapist-patient privilege apply as
well to the more general privilege. He argues that the two privileges
should have the same scope. In particular, Professor Broun would
hold both privileges inapplicable where a party seeks the general
55
medical records of patients involved only incidentally in the case.
However, where the issue concerns actual communications between
physician and patient or notes directly reflecting such
communications, Professor Broun suggests that the two privileges be
given the same scope. 56 Professor Broun thus provides clear
guidelines for the possible codification of the medical privileges.
Many rules of evidence rely on assumptions concerning human
behavior. This is certainly true of a number of the hearsay
exceptions. For example, the assumption supposedly supporting the
reliability of dying declarations 57 is that people who believe they are
51. Kenneth S. Broun, The Medical Privilege in the Federal CourtsShould It Matter Whether Your Ego Or Your Elbow Hurts?, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 657 (2004).
52. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
53. Broun, supra note 51, at 657.
54. Id. at 659.
55. Id. at 699.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (providing that in a homicide
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about to die are unlikely to speak dishonestly.58 While this is
certainly true for some people, it is not true for all people and all
cultures, and today the underpinnings of the dying declaration
exception are highly dubious. 59 Nevertheless, the courts continue to
prosecution or a civil action, "a statement made by a declarant while believing
that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances
of what the declarant believed to be impending death" is not to be excluded by
the hearsay rule).
58. In The King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (K.B. 1789), Chief
Baron Eyre wrote:
[T]he general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted
is, that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at
the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone; when
every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn,
and so awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal
to that which is created by a positive oath administered in a Court of
Justice.
Wigmore agreed with this basic view, writing that "[a]ll courts have agreed...
that the approach of death produces a state of mind in which the utterances of
the dying person are to be taken as free from all ordinary motives to misstate."
5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1438, at 289
(James H. Chadbourn rev., 1974); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 244 (1895) ("[T]he sense of impending death is presumed to remove all
temptation to falsehood and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as
would the obligation of the oath.").
The authors of one article state:
[T]he dying declarations exception arises from the cultural experience
of "facing one's Maker" as a moment of truth. But in a culture that
only grows more cynical about the authenticity of religious
experience, the exception loses its rhetorical force. Dying declarations
no longer evoke the image of a person making a solemn statement on
the death bed, before a confessor, surrounded by family members.
Instead, we more commonly envision a drugged, whispering patient in
an impersonal hospital, alone except for a detective holding a little
black book and straining to hear a name gasped against the flow of
pure oxygen. The contemporary image lacks the comforting effect of
the traditional one.
59. Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation
Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 156 (1995). Even in the nineteenth century, some
doubted the validity of the assumptions supporting the dying declaration
exception, at least under some circumstances. One writer quoted a native of
Madras, India, who stated, "Such evidence.., ought never to be admitted in
any case. What motive for telling the truth can any man possibly have when
he is at the point of death?" 1 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 448-49 (1883).
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adhere to the exception, and codifiers write it in stone as though
there were no doubt of its validity. The same is true of a number of
61
60
other hearsay exceptions as well as other rules of evidence.
Clearly, there is a need for more careful analysis of the behavioral underpinnings of evidence rules. Professor Edward J.
Imwinkelried's contribution to this Symposium does just that with
respect to privileges. 62 Professor Imwinkelried is the author of a
two-volume work on evidentiary privileges for The New Wigmore: A
Treatise on Evidence.63 His paper analyzes psychological literature
on self-disclosure as a means of testing the behavioral assumptions
that support the rules of privilege. Specifically, he tests Wigmore's
assertion that confidentiality is necessary to promote disclosure
within certain relationships. 6 Professor Imwinkelried shows that

60. For example, psychological research has severely undermined the
assumed trustworthiness of excited utterances. See Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous
Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928) (stating that "[w]hat the
emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire to lie, it loses by impairing the
declarant's power of observation"). But see Roger C. Park, Visions of
Applying the Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1149, 1151 (2003). That author discusses weaknesses in the conclusions of
Hutchins and Slesinger and notes that:
[T]he justification for creating an excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule begins to look better when one considers the adversarial
climate. Whatever the shortcomings of excited utterances, they are
generally made before the declarant has been subjected to the
influence of lawyers and interested parties. Because of the absence of
adversarial pressures, they are likely to be more accurate than many
other types of hearsay. Moreover, jurors might be in a better position
to judge and discount the effect of excitement than they are to assess
institutional influences on witnesses.
Id.
61. One example of such a rule in another area of evidence law is the
subsequent remedial measures rule. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407. The
assumption that people are more likely to repair dangerous products or
conditions if evidence of the repair will not be admissible in court has not been
tested. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE; SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY

§ 2.4.1 (rev. ed.

2002) (discussing assumptions underlying the rule).
62. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions
Underlying the Law ofEvidentiaryPrivileges:Insights From the Literatureon
Self-Disclosure, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 707 (2004).
63. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 7.
64. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 709.
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although some psychological research supports Wigmore, most such
research does not.65 If this research is accurate, Professor
Imwinkelried argues, Wigmore's influential view that privileges
must be absolute in character rather than qualified is suspect.
Imwinkelried examines the implications of this research for the law
of privileges, and considers whether trial judges should have greater
discretion
to
admit evidence
of otherwise
privileged
communications.
Though he does not specifically address
codification, Professor Imwinkelried's conclusions should have an
important impact on the codification effort.
Professor Paul Rice has served as Director of the Evidence
Project at American University's Washington College of Law. He
66
has authored treatises on both the federal attorney-client privilege
and the attorney-client privilege in the states and the District of
Columbia.67 He has written extensively about evidence codification.
For this Symposium, 68 Professor Rice argues against codification of
evidence law and for a return to the common law process. He
reviews the way the Judicial Conference has managed the Federal
Rules of Evidence, with special emphasis on the relatively brief
history of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which was not appointed until nearly twenty years after Congress
adopted the Federal Rules. Professor Rice critiques the Advisory
Committee's work in each year, 69 reveals the "management
principles" the Committee appears to follow, 70 and reaches several
potentially devastating conclusions. The most important of these is
that although the Committee has focused on making the rules more
functional, there have been few efforts to improve the substance of
the Federal Rules. 7 1 As a consequence, the Federal Rules fail to give
meaningful structure and guidance to the law of evidence. 72 He also
65. Id. at 713-15.
66. PAUL R. RICE,

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES

(2d ed. 1999).

67. PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (Rice Pub.
2004).
68. Paul R. Rice, Back to the Future With Privileges: Abandon
Codification,Not the Common Law, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739 (2005).
69. Id. at 744-54.
70. Id. at 755-78.
71. Id. at 755.

72. Id. at 755-56.
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voices deep concern about the influence of "special interest groups"
on the Advisory Committee's work,73 which he believes has unduly
Professor Rice ultimately
affected the Committee's focus.
concludes:
The best... of both the common law and codification could
be achieved if (1) the common law evidentiary rule-making
authority were officially recognized by abolishing the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a binding code, and (2) the
role of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
In its modified role, the
Evidence were changed.
Committee would facilitate the development of the rules by
the judiciary by crystallizing current practices in a coherent
framework. It would achieve this by exposing problems
and offering preferred solutions to both existing and
developing issues--compelling nothing, but influencing
through reason and structure. 74
This means, of course, that privileges should not be codified, at
least in the form of the other rules that currently make up the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Professor Rice further supports this conclusion
with a detailed examination of the evolution of the federal attorneyclient privilege under the common law, a process that has allowed
the courts to hone the privilege and resolve issues concerning its
scope and application. 75 Professor Rice argues that had the attorneyclient privilege been codified initially as part of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, many of these same issues would not have been addressed,
nor would they have been resolved in the years since adoption of the
Federal Rules.
Like Professor Rice, Professor Paul Kirgis is a codification
skeptic. Unlike Rice, however, Kirgis believes privileges should be
codified. That is the primary thesis of his contribution to this
Symposium.

76

Though this is Professor Kirgis' first foray into the

law of privileges, his scholarship has touched on a number of aspects

73. Id. at 779-81.
74. Id. at 806-07.
75. Id. at 792-804.
76. Paul F. Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification:
Why Most Rules of Evidence Should Not Be Codified-But Privilege Law
Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 809 (2005).
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of evidence law, most importantly the certification of experts 77 and
the problem of the "expert juror." 78 Here, Professor Kirgis sets forth
a number of standards for evaluating proposed codifications, and
though he focuses primarily on the codification of privilege law, he
considers the standards to be applicable more generally. As the title
of the paper suggests, Kirgis
approaches
the topic
"legisprudentially." He argues that because our legal system is
rooted in the common law, legislation must be justified in relation to
how it affects the common law. In particular, he argues, legislation
must serve two functions: "an 'ordering' function, directed at
ensuring the efficiency and fairness of existing common law rules;
and a 'remedial' function, directed at correcting errors in the
common law.",79 While most evidence rules are not capable of
serving these two functions, privilege rules can. 80 Professor Kirgis
first critiques the traditional justifications for codification, paying
particular attention to the question of whether the traditional
justifications of uniformity and efficiency enhance procedural
justice. 8 1 He then offers an alternative analysis of the value of
codification based on normative standards of natural law, social
utility, and justice, that accounts for the preeminence of the common
law, and that serves both the ordering and remedial functions. 82 He
then applies these principles to evidence law, concluding, as noted
above, that codification of privileges can be justified but that other
areas of evidence law should not be codified. He writes: "Assuming
that we believe privileges are valuable and should be maintained...
the law of privilege is probably the area of evidence law most in
need of legislation in the service of the ordering function,"8 3 and that
"the need for codification is significantly greater than for most other
84
evidence rules because privilege law affects primary conduct."
Professor Kenneth Graham has written numerous volumes of a
77. Paul F. Kirgis, Curtailingthe JudicialCertificationofExpert Witnesses,
24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347 (2000).

78. Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror,75 TEMP. L. REv. 493
(2002).
79. Kirgis, supra note 76, at 812.
80. Id.at 812-13.
81. Id.at 813-31.
82. Id.at 831-44.
83. Id. at 856.
84. Id. at 858.

Winter 2004]

INTRODUCTION

major treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 85 including several
on privileges. 86 For this Symposium, he focuses on an often-ignored
area of privilege law: government privileges. 87 Like Professor Rice,
he is concerned about issues of power and influence in the creation
and shaping of privileges. He begins by asserting a truth that few of
us know: "[T]he government enjoys more privileges than any other
litigant. In addition to privileges available to ordinary citizens and
organizations, such as the attorney-client privilege, the government
litigant." 88
can claim many privileges available to no other
Moreover, rather than being created through a neutral mechanism (or
at least one that allows for significant public comment), these
privileges have been "shaped by ambitious bureaucrats, craven
judges, and corrupt legislators... .,89 Professor Graham argues that
our government has adopted a particular model of secrecy that brings
both advantages and disadvantages to those who possess the secret
information. 90 Most importantly, however, this model tends to
impair the development and maintenance of a democratic
government. Judges, in turn, are not neutral or independent, but
instead show enormous deference to government secrets. Indeed,
Graham argues, judges who consider denying government claims of
privilege place at risk the chances of advancement through the
judicial hierarchy. 91 Professor Graham also blames the promotion of
government secrecy on the American economic system, which, he
92
asserts, benefits from hidden forms of government cooperation.
The result is lax regulation of corporate actions that affect the public
health and well-being. 93 Professor Graham concludes his paper with
85. 21-25, 30-31 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EvIDENCE (1977).

W.

GRAHAM, JR.,

86. 23-25 id.
87. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Government Privileges: A Cautionary Tale

for Codifiers, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 861 (2004).
88. Id. at 862 (footnotes omitted). Among these are privileges for state
secrets, official information, identity of informers, mental processes, bank
examiners, and police surveillance location. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 862.
90. Id. at 870-72.
91. Id. at 873-74.
92. Id. at 874-80.
93. As an example, Professor Graham reviews the Bush administration's
development of its National Energy Policy, a process that took place outside
the public eye and which proceeded largely in secret and with significant
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some "Ruminations from the Ruins, 9 4 in which he speculates on the
desirability of codifying both government and other privileges.
Perhaps most importantly, he urges a return to the fundamental moral
values (including social justice for the poor) that should inform
government in general and judicial process in particular, and a
greater effort to understand the interrelationship between rules of
evidence and substantive law.
II. CONCLUSION

The law of privileges has been attacked from two opposing
directions. On one side of the divide are those who see rules of
privilege as a hindrance to the search for truth. Following
Wigmore's lead,95 these commentators argue that the reach of
relational privileges should be strictly confined to those relationships
that cannot function effectively without the assurance of
confidentiality-even from the reach of judicial process. Few
relationships meet this test. On the other side are those who claim
that privileges serve important values that more often outweigh the
harm to the truth determination process that the recognition of the
privilege might cause. These scholars also point to inequities in the
scope of privileges, which often shield powerful or wealthy parties
while leaving those with less access to power and money
unprotected. Privileges should be expended, it is argued, into new
realms such as the parent-child and financial advisor-client
relationships.
involvement of business interests that stood to gain from the emerging policy.

Id. at 880-88.
94. Id. at 897-902.
95. Wigmore believed that privileges should be recognized only within
relationships that meet four standards:
(1) The communications must initiate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.

(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the

correct disposal of litigation.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
McNaughton rev. 1961).

IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 2285 (John T.
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I am confident that the Articles in this Symposium make
significant contributions to the ongoing discussion about privileges.
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